Theory and empirics are ambiguous on the effect of democracy on growth. Crosscountry studies find that democracy has no significant impact on growth. In contrast, within-country studies find a strong positive effect of transition to democracy. We reconcile this inconsistency by showing that the positive effect of political transition is a result of swift regime change and not democratization. We identify and examine 90 successful, failed, and gradual transitions that have occurred over the last half century. This new classification permits us to compare successful episodes of democratization with unsuccessful ones -as opposed to with the counterfactual of no transition. We find that both successful and failed transitions boost long-run growth by about one percentage point, but gradual change is quite costly in economic terms. The results imply that the growth dividend from political transition is a result of regime change and not democratization, and also offer new evidence on the importance of the speed of transition for economic growth. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, to stricter and more lenient definitions of democratic transition, and to including reverse transitions.
Introduction
Do democracies grow significantly faster than autocracies? The empirical evidence is mixed.
The cross-country literature finds no evidence that democratic institutions bring higher income growth (Barro, 1996 (Barro, , 1997 Rodrik, 1999; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001) . By contrast, more recent work focusing on within-country effects of democratization offer some reasons for optimism regarding economic performance in countries that transit successfully to is indeed a causal effect of democracy on income growth that is obscured in cross-country studies because of other country-specific factors, which can be controlled for more precisely in time-series analysis. An alternative explanation, however, is that democratic transitions are more likely when the autocratic regime has performed poorly, and the positive effect of transition to democracy on growth is a result of an incompetent regime being replaced with a less incompetent one. Hence, the growth acceleration that occurs following political transition is about regime change and not about democracy.
In this paper, we test this hypothesis using a new data set of political regime transitions.
We compare the long-run impact on growth of successful transitions (new democracies that permanently consolidate) against failed transitions (new democracies that quickly revert to autocracy). We also estimate the interim effect of democracy, for short-lived democracies before they fail, and of reversed transitions (transitions from democracy to autocracy).
Unlike previous work that focuses on the growth effect of permanent democratic transitions, this classification allows us to isolate the effect of regime change from the effect of democracy. Our main finding is that the growth dividend found in within-country studies of transition to democracy is about removing a regime that produced poor economic outcomes, as opposed to a result of democratization.
Theory has long held ambiguous views of democracy on economic outcomes. On the one hand, dictators typically have more power and hence the ability to steal more from the public, with deleterious consequences for growth. Moreover, the political freedoms that come with democracy may support economic rights and opportunities (Friedman 1962 ). On the other hand, democracies tend to be associated with more redistribution and a potentially greater role for special interests that misuse resources (Barro 1996) . In addition to static differences between the two systems, the expected duration in office matters, which tends to be more limited in democracies. Clague et al. (1996) show that transitory democracies can easily suffer from extensive expropriation because the incentive to steal and steal big is greater when the time horizon is short. Similarly, Khan (2006) argues that in a democracy, if politicians believe there is little chance of reelection ex ante, corruption tends to increase ex post, leading to a democratic equilibrium with frequent turnover, high corruption, and low growth.
Our main empirical result is consistent with the view that democracy has no significant growth effect, and shows that positive results from previous time-series studies stem from regime change. In particular, regime transition yields a significant growth premium in the long run, irrespective of whether democracy is achieved or there is a reversion to autocracy.
Specifically, countries that fall back into autocracy few years after democratic transition experience growth acceleration by 1.4 percentage points against 0.9 percentage point for countries that secure democracy in the long run. However these point estimates are not statistically different. In addition we find no evidence of a significant democracy effect in transitory democracies. These results imply that regime change facilitates the replacement of incompetent governments with more competent ones, but the political constitution of the new government is of little importance.
A second important contribution is the statistically significant economic cost of lengthy regime transitions relative to rapid transitions. Specifically, gradual regime change from autocracy to democracy is associated with a negative short-run effect on income growth immediately following the onset of transition, with no significant long-run gain. This compares poorly with the roughly one percentage point boost in long-term growth subsequent to rapid transition. The uncertainty associated with protracted regime change may be detrimental to firms' activity and investment decisions (Rodrik, 1991) .
Our work builds on the large empirical literature on the link between democracy and economic performance. 1 We depart from previous within-country studies in that we estimate the output response following both successful, gradual, failed, and reversed transitions in order to disentangle the effect of regime change from that of democracy. 2 We focus on 1 See for example Helliwell (1994) , Alesina and Rodrick (1994) , Borner et al. (1995) , Barro (1996 Barro ( , 1997 , Minier (1998) estimates that among different dimensions of political instability, only the instability of the political regime, changes in the polity or political leaders or constitution, has a robust and significant negative effect on economic growth. Our work contributes to this line of work by examining the effect of political instability on economic growth in rapid versus gradual regime change. The results are consistent with this line of thinking, as there is no long-run growth dividend during a gradual change, and negative growth effects during the early years are never recovered.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section presents the data and the democratic transitions data set. Section 3 provides evidence on the link between democratization and economic development. Section 4 describes the estimation framework. Section 5 presents the main empirical findings and section 6 performs some robustness checks. Finally, the last section concludes.
Data and Democratic Transitions
A significant innovation in our paper is that we construct a new data set of democratic transitions and identify four types of regime transitions: the successful, the gradual, the failed and the reversed, based on the intensity, the speed and the sustainability of the political reform process (Freund and Jaud, 2012 Our measure of democratic institutions is the revised Polity score (polity2) of the Polity IV data base (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2010). The Polity score reflects key characteristics of the executive recruitment, the constitutional constraints on the executive authority and the degree of fairness and competitiveness in political participation. The index ranges from -10 to +10 with higher values indicating higher level of political freedom. 4 We build on the Polity score, and use four filters to identify episodes of regime transition. 5 Our sample includes 160 countries between 1960 and 2010. 67
A successful transition is defined as a substantial rapid and sustained regime change from autocracy to democracy. A transition in time t qualifies as successful if the following conditions are met:
(i) the Polity score increased by at least 6 points over a 3-year period,
(ii) the Polity score in time t is above 5, (iii) following transition the Polity score remains stable above 5 until the end of the time period, 4 We use the Polity2 variable that is a modified version of the Polity index in previous versions of the dataset. A simple treatment, or "fix" is applied to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). 5 To ensure consistency in the timing of the transition for all four types of transitions, the year of transition -or the year of initiation of transition in the case of a gradual transition -is the year t in which the Polity score change occured.to identify episodes of regime change or transitions, between autocracy and democracy. 6 The dataset dates back to 1800. We use the data starting from 1960 to match the GDP growth data. The data is not rectangular, as some countries were created during the time period. (e.g. the former soviet bloc countries), or changed names (e.g. Tchecoslovakia that split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in 1992). New states and states that changed names are treated as new countries in our analysis. In addition, we exclude from the sample countries with less than nine years of consecutive Polity data to allow for identification of transitions.
7 For newly-established countries, when no Polity data is available prior to the country creation, we impute the "Parent" state Polity score to allow for the identification of transitions. The former Soviet Union countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzst Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The former Yougoslavia countries include Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia. And the former Czechoslovakia countries include Czech Republic and Slovak Republic.
(iv) the regime in place has been non-democratic for at least 5 years prior to transition Condition (i) ensures a sudden and substantial political-regime change. Condition (ii) marks the year of transition as the year the Polity score increased and ensures that a minimum level of democracy is reached in the first year of the transition. 8 Condition (iii) ensures that the transition is sustained with no reversal to autocratic regime. 9 Finally condition (iv) ensures that the transition is a relatex gime change from autocracy to democracy and not a recovery from a previous drop in the Polity score. Spain in 1977 is a good illustration of a successful transition, moving from autocratic to fully democratic.
A failed transition is defined as a "non-successful" transition. That is, at least one condition in the set of "successful" conditions is not met. Either, the regime change is not substantial enough and a transition in time t qualifies as failed if the following conditions are met:
(i) the Polity score increased by at least 3 points over a 3-year period,
(ii) the Polity score in time t is above 0 but at most 5, (iii) the regime in place has been non-democratic for at least 5 years prior to transition. 8 The level 5 cutoff is arbitrary; however, it is the mean value of the Polity index in the democratic range of the index from 0 to 10. In addition, the Polity distribution is bimodal, with most countries clustered at the high (≥ 5) or low (≤ −5) ends of the distribution. While scores above 5 mask substantial differences in the way democracies function, all countries with Polity scores above 5, no matter how heterogeneous, are sharply different than the countries below 5. 9 We allow the index to decrease by at most 2 Polity points as there may be some adjustments over the years after transition. For example in Honduras transition occurred in 1982, in 1985 the Polity index decreased from 6 to 5 for 4 years before returning and then exceeding its original transition level.
Alternatively, the regime change is substantial but not sustained and a transition in time t qualifies as failed if the following conditions are met: Table 1 lists all transitions by category country and year in our sample. Seventy-nine of the 160 countries in our sample, close to 50 percent, initiated a democratic transition, with 10 countries experiencing more than one transition. 10 And a typical country has about a 30 percent chance of experiencing a democratic regime change at some point in any given decade. 11 Figure 2 illustrates our identification strategy. Unlike previous works, the distinction we make of different types of transitions, allows us to disentangle the effect on growth of regime change from that of democracy. We are able to test whether it is the former or the latter that do matter for economic growth, by looking into the long run effects of failed compared with successful transitions, swift compared with gradual regime change and democratic with autocratic regime change.
Fluctuations in Growth around Transitions
This section reviews the trends and fluctuations in per capita income growth before, during and following transition for the four types of transitions identified in the previous section. Figure 3 shows the evolution of log per capita real income growth in a twenty year interval around transition for successful and failed transitions. Figure 4 presents graphs for gradual and reversed transitions. 12 On the horizontal axes negative values mark years before and positive values years after the date the transition is initiated. After restricting our sample to countries with available data for at least ten years before and after the transition, we are left with a sample of 30 successful, 17 failed and 13 gradual transitions. In the case of reversed transitions, data is available from 5 year prior to 8 year after the date of transition for a balanced sample of 14 transitions. 13 Democratization has a non-linear effect on growth (Figure 3 panel a) . Growth is highly volatile around the date of transition suggesting some heterogeneity across countries in the timing of transition and its effect on the economy. To account for this, the data is calibrated by the year of slowest growth within a four year interval before and after the date of transition (trough year) rather than by the year of transition. A more distinct picture emerges (Figure 3 panel b) . For successful and failed transitions, growth typically dips for one year or two before it returns to or exceeds previous levels. Average income 12 We use the GDPpc in constant 2005 US$. Data are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators database (2010). 13 A number of countries experienced a reversed transition in the early sixties. In addition, the majority of those countries then experienced episodes of democratic transition in the remainder of the time period thus limiting the number of observations for the analysis. Overall, all transitions are associated with significant costs in the short-run. However, the cost is lower and rapidly offset by higher longer-run growth when the regime change is rapid whether successful, failed or even reversed. Only, when the transition is gradual, are economies hit harder and longer. This preliminary analysis offer suggestive evidence that the growth premium associated with transitions, may be about the pace rather than the direction of the regime change.
Estimation Framework
To test whether regime change rather than democracy is the main driver of economic growth, we estimate the within-country effects of democratization on income growth, using a difference in difference framework. We build on our new data set of political transitions and define several dummy variables to estimate the effect of various types of transitions on the log difference in annual income per capita in country i at time t g i,t . The dummy variable successful, takes on a value of 1 in the year and subsequent years of any successful democratic transition. The dummy variable failed, takes on a value of 1 in the year and subsequent years of any failed transition. The dummy variable temporary, takes on a value of 1 in the year and subsequent years of any failed transition when a democratic regime was in place and returns to 0 when the regime reverts back from democracy to autocracy (Polity score< 0). In addition, the dummy variable gradual, takes on a value of 1 in the year and subsequent years of any gradual transition. The sum of the three dummy variables, successful, failed, and gradual, is labeled transition, and takes on a value of 1 in all years following a democratic transition. The parameters β, γ and δ, capture the contemporaneous effect of country-specific successful, failed and temporary transitions on income. The difference in difference estimation is ideally suited to distinguish the impact of different regime transitions relative to the counterfactual of no regime change.
Democratic transition is the treatment while countries that do not transition -always autocratic, always democratic and intermediary -are in the control group. The inclusion in our estimations of country and time fixed effects (φ i + φ t ) allows us to control for determinants of economic growth having to do with time-invariant country characteristics, such as geography, natural resources or colonial history or time-varying shocks that affect all countries. Our basic framework is as follows:
where υ is a disturbance term. We use the same estimation equation (1) 
where ω is a disturbance term. We further define corresponding dummies for each type of
, and gradual (G 1 ,
. 16 In this case the estimating equation becomes
where ε is a disturbance term. Table 2 illustrates the construction of the set of dummies in the example of a successful transition. Table 3 summarizes the definitions for our variables and Table 4 contains summary statistics for key data. Table 5 shows the difference in difference estimates of the effect of democratization on real per capita GDP growth using equation (1) . We report least squares estimates and robust standard errors clustered at the country level (in parentheses). All our results refer to the 1961-2010 period. Column 1 estimates the effect of any democratic transition on growth.
Empirical Results
In particular, following transition countries grow 0. that fails to reject the null hypothesis of equality of the estimates on the success and failed variables. Combined together results in columns 1-3 suggest that the positive and significant democratization effect shown in column 1 is about political regime change rather than establishing democracy. A concern is that our coefficients may be picking the effect of the market reforms that occurred simultaneously with the political reforms in former soviet countries. Columns 4-6, replicate estimations in columns 1-3 excluding socialist countries from the sample. Our results are even stronger. The coefficients on our dummy variables success and failed increase both in magnitude and significance; while the coefficient on the temporary variable remains statistically insignificant. Table 6 considers the effect of the pace and intensity of the regime change on growth.
In columns 1-2 we augment the specification in column 3 Table 5 by the gradual transitions indicator variable. Column 1 shows that a gradual regime change has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on growth following transition. Private companies and foreign investors prefer a stable political environment to do business. A high propensity of regime change is associated with more uncertainty about policies of a potential new government. This lowers firms' incentives to invest, in turn affecting economic development (Svensson, 1998) . Column 2 estimates the effect of major versus partial changes in the Polity score for failed transitions. The estimate on the dummy variable partial is statistically insignificant, while the estimate on the failed variable remains positive and significant.
The results suggest that a rapid and complete regime change, whether sustained or not, rather than a gradual or partialmove towards democracy yields a growth acceleration in the years following the change. Column 3 augments specification in column 1 by the reverse transitions indicator variable. The reversed dummy captures the growth effect of a regime change from democracy to autocracy. Hence, we test whether the direction of the political transition differentially affects subsequent growth. Our results show a positive but not statistically significant effect of reversed regime change on growth. This is further evidence that the growth effect of democratic transitions is about change not about democracy. Excluding socialist countries from the sample in columns 4-6, leaves our results qualitatively unchanged. Combined together our findings in Table 5 and 6 suggest that the change in political regime rather than the type of regime matters more for economic development.
The coefficients on the democratic transitions variables in Table 5 and 6 capture the average annual growth during the post-transition period. However as shown in Figures   3 and 4 the output response following transition is non monotonic. Table 7 columns 1-2 estimate the timing of the economic effect of all democratic transitions using equation (2) .
In column 1 we find that income growth does not statistically vary in anticipation of the collapse of the authoritarian regime. The estimate on the T 2 pulse variable is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent implying a decrease in annual income growth by The estimates on the T 5 pulse variable are positive and statistically significant for successful and failed transitions. Our results suggest that the uncertainty associated with piecemeal attempts to transition has a negative effect on growth, while countries that swiftly removed past regime experienced higher growth in the long run.
Robustness Checks
This section explores the robustness of our main result on regime change. Table 8 reestimates the effect of democratic transitions on income growth using the specification of column 3 in Table 5 as our benchmark model -which focuses on successful, failed and temporary. It may be that omitted variables drive our results. Columns 1-2 test the sensitivity of our estimates including two lags of additional time-varying controls; capital accumulation, human capital, government consumption and trade openness. Our results are robust to controlling for those additional covariates. Column 3-4 control for regional dynamics and include year*region fixed effects and columns 5-6 check that our results are not driven by poor estimates of growth after or before a transition. We impose that the number of observations with growth data available before and after transition is the same.
We call this sample the "balanced" sample. Our results remain qualitatively the same.
Column 7-8 check that our results are not driven by time trends not captured by the time effects. We estimate a placebo specification, where the initiation of the each transition is lagged by five years. The point estimates are not statistically significant implying that our results are driven by the specific events we are focusing on. Table 9 uses specification of column 3 in Table 5 Finally, Table 10 replicates the series of robustness checks in Table 8 using equation (3), using pulse variables. Our results remain qualitatively the same.
Concluding Remarks
This paper reconciles the contrasting results from the cross-country and within-country literature on democracy and growth. We show that the positive growth effect found in the within-country literature is about regime change as opposed to democratization. We use a new data set of political transitions where we classify transitions into successful, failed, gradual and reversed, based on the intensity, pace and sustainability of the regime change.
We are able to compare the long run impact on growth of failed transitions with successful transitions. We also estimate the effect of democracy in new democracies before they fail.
In doing so, we are able to disentangle the effect of regime change from that of democracy.
Our empirical analysis suggests that a rapid democratic transition whether or not successful is associated with a significant growth premium in the long run. Our estimates suggest that following swift transition irrespective of whether it succeeds or fails, there is a growth premium of about one percentage point. These estimates likely reflect the positive effect of removing an inefficient regime whose rule has led to systematic economic mismanagement. Another important result is the statistically significant economic cost of lengthy regime transitions compared with rapid transitions. The uncertainty associated with piecemeal regime change is detrimental to firms' activity and investment, hence limiting the speed of economic development.
Our results highlight how failing to account for different features in the political reform process explains the contrasting empirical evidence around one of the most debated question in economics. While the cross-country literature estimates the "no" effect of democracy on growth, the within-country literature captures the positive effect of change of regime. Failed transition  dummies  T2 T3  T4  S2 S3  S4  F2 F3  F4  - The combined Polity score is the difference between the democracy and autocracy indicator. This is an additive twenty-one-point scale (-10;10).
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GDPpc growth Real per capita GDP growth is defined as the annual logarithmic change of real per capita GDP from t-1 to t. Data are in constant 2000 dollars. Authors' calculations. 83) The method of estimation is least square. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the t-1 to t log difference in real per capita GDP (WDI 2010). Country with less than twenty years of observations for the dependent variable are dropped from the sample. The F-test of equality of the estimates on the success and failed variables is reported. The variable transition is the sum of the three dummy variables, successful, failed, and gradual, and takes on a value of 1 in all years following a democratic transition.The constant is not reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The method of estimation is least square. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the t-1 to t log difference in real per capita GDP (WDI 2010). Country with less than twenty years of observations for the dependent variable are dropped from the sample. The F-test of equality of the estimates on the success and failed variables is reported.
The constant is not reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The method of estimation is least square. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the t-1 to t log difference in real per capita GDP (WDI 2010). Country with less than twenty years of observation for the dependent variable are dropped from the sample. The constant is not reported.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The method of estimation is least square. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the t-1 to t log difference in real per capita GDP (WDI 2010). Country with less than twenty years of observations for the dependent variable are dropped from the sample. The F-test of equality of the estimates on the success and failed variables is reported. The constant is not reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The method of estimation is least square. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the t-1 to t log difference in real per capita GDP (WDI 2010). Country with less than twenty years of observations for the dependent variable are dropped from the sample. The F-test of equality of the estimates on the success and failed variables is reported. The constant is not reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The method of estimation is least square. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the t-1 to t log difference in real per capita GDP (WDI 2010). For each of the following controls -investment, life expectancy, government consumption and trade share -we include a two-year lag of the variable (coefficients are not reported). Country with less than twenty years of observation for the dependent variable are dropped from the sample. The constant is not reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
